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COMMENTS
EXTENDING THE TEXAS OIL AND GAS LEASE BY THE
HABENDUM, DRY HOLE, AND SHUT-IN ROYALTY
CLAUSES
Rarely has the law recognized an interest in realty as ephemeral
as that of the usual oil and gas lease. From the moment the
lease is executed, the parties thereto are aware that this interest may
terminate at almost any time. As the lease nears or passes the end
of the primary term, the lessor and the lessee, knowing the slightest
inadvertence may extinguish this interest, become acutely conscious
of its fragility. To protect his interest, it is essential that the lessee
know what activities are required of him and at what time he must
conduct these activities. The purpose herein will be to explore the
requisite activities and appropriate timing necessary to extend and
continue the lease beyond the primary term, the approach being
limited to the habendum, dry hole, and shut-in gas royalty clauses
of the lease. The basic clause, of course, is the habendum. However, as it is modified substantially by the dry hole and shut-in
royalty clauses, it seems proper that they be considered together.
I.

THE HABENDUM CLAUSE

The modern habendum clause of an oil and gas lease commonly
provides that the lessee's interest is vested for a definite term of
years--called the primary term-and as long thereafter as oil and
gas, or either of them, is produced.' A literal construction of the
habendum clause would require no activity by the lessee in order
to sustain the lease during the primary term, as this clause purports
to vest unconditionally in the lessee certain mineral rights for a
term of years. However, because the doctrine of abandonment is
said to operate as an unwritten special limitation on the lessee's interest, some action by him has been regarded as essential to the
continuance of the lease during this fixed term.! To circumvent
abandonment, the typical lease contains a delay rental clause whereby
the lessee may perpetuate the lease during the primary term without
'For a discussion of the history of the evolution of the habendum clause as well as the
remainder of the contemporary lease see 2 Summers, Oil & Gas § 281-307 (perm. ed. 1959);
Veasley, The Law of Oil & Gas, IV, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 161 (1920); Walker, The Nature
of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 Texas L. Rev. 1
(1928); Comment, 11 Sw. L.J. 340, 342 (1957).
2 Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304 (1923); see Masterson, The Shut-in
Royalty Clause in an Oil & Gas Lease, 12 Sw. L.J. 459, 461 (1958).
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conducting drilling operations by the annual payment of "delay
rentals" to the lessor.' Since this Comment will treat primarily the
problem of extending the lease beyond the primary term, the necessary elements of activity by a lessee during the primary term will
be considered only as they incidentally affect the paramount problem.
A. Production That Will Extend The Term
The fundamental characteristic of the extended term is the necessity of production as the prerequisite for maintaining the leasehold
estate. Under Texas law, this leasehold estate is defined as a determinable fee in the oil and gas with the "thereafter" or "production"
clause operating as a special limitation upon the estate." Production,
therefore, is a condition precedent to the extension of the lessee's
interest beyond the primary term.' Determining if the condition is
satisfied would seem to be relatively simple, yet an analysis of the cases
reveals ambiguity in terminology and problems created by judicial
interpretation.
When the lease form merely provides that oil and gas shall be
"produced" and neglects to define this word elsewhere in the instrument, judicial construction of the lease becomes necessary.
According to the minority view, 'produced" does not mean "produced in paying quantities."" The production, however, must be
capable of division,' i.e., it must be tangible and substantial, and
there must be more than a mere showing of oil and gas." Until
Garcia v. King' Texas recognized the minority rule."0 However, in
the Garcia case the Texas Supreme Court committed the state to
the view that "produced" means "produced in paying quantities,"
See Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw. L.J. 1 (1952); Scurlock, Practical and Legal Problems in Delay Rental and Shut-in Royalty Payments, Southwestern Legal Foundation 4th Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 17 (1953).
"Haby v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Stephens County
v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923); Caruthers v. Leonard,
254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
'Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783 (1941); Waggoner Estate v.
Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929); Morrison v. Swaim, 220 S.W.2d
493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107
S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.
8 Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 I11. 169, 102 N.E. 1043 (1913); Enfield v. Woods,
198 Ky. 328, 248 S.W. 842 (1923); cf. Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531,
64 S.E. 836 (1909). Oklahoma formerly followed this interpretation. Roach v. Junction
Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919). But 'see Woodruff v. Brady, 181
Okla. 105, 72 P.2d 709 (1937).
Adams v. Bennett, 282 S.W. 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error dism.
8Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 248 S.W. 842 (1923); McCraw Oil & Gas Co. v.
Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S.E. 1027 (1909).
9 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
'°Adams v. Bennett, 282 S.W. 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error dism.
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thereby abrogating a criterion of relative certainty for one of uncertainty." The court's reasoning was that the
object of the contract was to secure development of the property for
the mutual benefit of the parties. . . . So far as the lessees were concerned, the . . . continuation of the lease for an indefinite time after
the expiration of the primary period was to allow the lessees to reap
the full fruits of the investments made by them in developing the
property. Obviously, if the lease could no longer be operated at a
profit, there were no fruits for them to reap. The lessors should not
be required to suffer a continuation of the lease after the expiration
of the primary period merely for speculation purposes on the part
of the lessees.1
While this interpretation has precipitated considerable litigation,
such litigation has failed to resolve all the problems emanating from
this decision.
B. Paying Quantities Defined
Now that the term "produced" has a qualified meaning, viz.,
produced in paying quantities, what is the definition of paying quantities? The generally accepted rule as to what constitutes production
in "paying quantities" has often been stated to mean that the lessee
tnust produce in such quantities as will enable him to make a profit
over and above the cost of ooerating the well, although the cost
of drilling and equipping the well may never be repaid.
The recent Texas Supreme Court decision of Clifton v. Koontz"
has contributed toward an articulation of the various factors to be
considered in applying the test of paying quantities. Here, a lease,
covering 350 acres, was executed by the plaintiff in 1940. In 1949
during the primary term of the lease, the lessee drilled and produced
an "associated" (with oil) gas well. Other than its acidization in
" Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942). See also Continental Oil
Co. v. Boston-Texas Land Trust, 221 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955); West v. Continental Oil
Co., 91 F. Supp. 505 (S.D. Tex. 1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1952); Clifton v.
Koontz, -Tex.-.,
325 S.W.2d 684 (1959); Holchak v. Clark, 284 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955) error ref. Accord: Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F.2d 981 (6th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 634 (1940); Reynolds v. White Plains Oil & Gas Co.,
199 Ky. 243, 250 S.W. 975 (1923); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d
187 (1933); Woodruff v. Brady, 181 Okla. 105, 72 P.2d 709 (1937); Comment, supra
note 1, at 342.
12 Garcia v. King, supra note 11, at 512, 513. For a criticism of this interpretation see
Brown, The Law of Oil and Gas Leases § 5.02 (1958); Williams, Primary Term and Delay
Rental Provisions, Southwestern Legal Foundation 2d Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. &
Tax. 93, 107 (1951).
"aHenry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Walden v. Potts, 194 Okla. 453, 152
P.2d 923 (1944); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 Pac. 329 (1926); Young
v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 243, 45 Atl. 121 (1899); Clifton v. Koontz, .- __Tex.325
S.W.2d 684 (1959); Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
14 Supra note 13.
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1950, no other drilling or reworking operations were conducted until September 12, 1956, when the defendant, who acquired his lease
interest in June, 1956, by assignment, successfully reworked the
well by "sand fracting," thereby increasing production 1800 per
cent. The plaintiff claimed that the lease had terminated since the
lessee failed to maintain production from the well in paying quantities. The trial court found, and the court of civil appeals concurred,"
that the well continuously produced in paying quantities. In affirming the lower courts the supreme court concluded that the evidence
supported the trial court's findings. Where possible and applicable,
the importance of this decision will be considered in the development of this general principle.

1. Income from Lease
If it be assumed that the ultimate application of the "paying
quantities" test only requires one to look to an accounting record
of the lease in question, then, before "operating expenses" can be
classified, the income portion of this account must be ascertained."
However, the income accounting record for the lease may prove
deceptive since actual income or sale of the oil or gas is immaterialthe crucial item being actual production, whether sold or not."
Thus, the court should consider not only the amount of oil or gas
sold, but also that in storage at the time of the trial." In Clifton v.
Koontz" there was testimony that two to three months were required to accumulate a tank of oil before a sale could be made; hence,
an actual bookkeeping net loss to the lessee was shown for two consecutive months. The court, in repudiating this ostensible bookkeeping
loss, apparently considered (although not expressly stated) the
amount of unsold oil that was stored. This view would buttress the
supreme court's affirmance on the basis that the evidence supported
the trial court's verdict.

2. Period of Time
An additional problem in defining the scope of the term "paying
quantities" is "over what period of time should ... [operations] be
considered in determining whether the lease is now producing in
"Clifton v. Koontz, 305 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"For a thorough discussion of these accounting problems see Cage, Production in Paying Quantities: Technical Problems Involved, Southwestern Legal Foundation 10th Annual
Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 61 (1959).
"€Sullivan and Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e.; Cowden v. General Crude Oil Co., 217 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error
ref. n.r.e.
"Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954).
"-.Tex.-...,
325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
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paying quantities."20 Clifton v. Koontz" clearly delineates the issue.
Here, the plaintiffs based their contention that the well had ceased
to produce in paying quantities upon the showing that for the period
of time from June, 1955, through September, 1956, the income from
the lease was $3,250, and that the total expense of operations during
the same period was $3,466.16; thus, a loss of $216.16 for the sixteen-month period was sustained. During this period, however, some
months showed a gain and some a loss. For instance, the months of
July, August, and September of 1956 showed a total net loss of
$372.37. It was undisputed that reworking operations, which resulted in an 1800 per cent increase of production, were commenced
on September 12, 1956, and that under the terms of the lease the
lessee had a right to engage in such operations, provided that production had not ceased more than sixty days prior to the commencement of the operations. Therefore, it would seem that the small
operating loss occurring during the sixty-day period prior to commencement of reworking operations was not material to the main
issue. If this is true, the lessee operated at a profit of $111.25 for
a period of time beginning in June of 1955 and continuing through
July 12, 1956, the beginning of the sixty-day period. The record
further shows that a loss occurred during the months of April and
May, 1956, that for the year 1954, a profit was earned each month,
and that the aggregate profit was the sum of $1,575.00; that in
1955 the operations were profitable during nine months of the
year, with a net profit of $894.00 for the year; and that for the
first six months' period of 1956, the lease was operated at a profit of
$145.00.
The court was thus faced with three separate periods in which
"paying quantities" might be determined: (1) the original sixteenmonth period, June, 1955, through September, 1956, chosen by the
plaintiff; (2) this same sixteen-month period reduced by the "sixtyday clause" to a fourteen-month period, June, 1955, through July
12, 1956; and (3) the two consecutive months of April and May,
1956. In period (1) there was a net operating loss to the lessee of
$216.00. In period (2) there was a net profit of $111.25. In period
(3) there was a net loss. The court concluded that the lease did not
cease producing in "paying quantities." The choice of the appropriate
measuring period appears crucial, and the court apparently was of
the view that this choice must be decided on an ad hoc basis:
2 Cage, supra note 16, at 82.

'-..Tex-.,

325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

We again emphasize that there can be no limit as to time, whether
it be days, weeks, or months, to be taken into consideration in determining the question of whether paying production from the lease
has ceased."
The lease in question contained a sixty-day continuous drilling
clause which provided that if production should cease for any cause
after discovery the lease would not terminate if the lessee commenced
additional drilling or reworking operations within sixty days.2
Under the present facts the lessee did in fact commence additional
reworking on September 12, 1956. Because of these reworking operations, it was concluded that if production had in fact ceased on July
12, 1956, this clause would give the lessee a sixty-day period of
grace in which to commence further operations. Since the lessee did
commence reworking on September 12, 1956, this sixty-day period
reduced the original period chosen by the plaintiff by sixty days.
By such construction of the lease contract, the status of production after July 12, 1956, becomes irrelevant and the original period
of sixteen months chosen by the plaintiffs, in which there was a loss,
is reduced to a fourteen-month period in which there was a net
profit.
All lessors seeking to cancel the lease should not assume that they
will necessarily be confronted with this interpretation. The lease in
question must contain such a clause, and for it to be applicable, it
may be necessary that the lessee actually commence reworking operations or additional drilling. 4 If the sixty-day continuous drilling
clause had not been applicable, the court would have been faced with
a sixteen-month period in which there was a net loss. Had the
court in such a situation held that the lessee had not ceased to produce in paying quantities, the opinion would necessarily have given
extremely favorable treatment to lessees. In addition, such an interpretation would have almost nullified the concept of paying
quantities. However, since the opinion must be construed within
its facts, the only issue as to a period of substantial duration before
the court was the second period, i.e., the reduced period of fourteen
months in which the record showed a net profit. Since there was a
net profit to the lessee over the fourteen-month period considered
by the court, the case is limited authority on the question of the
precise period determinative of the status of production in paying
quantities. The court was, however, required to dispose of the third
period, i.e., the months of April and May, 1956, which was the only
22 Supra note 21, at 690.
2 See discussion pp. 377-80
24See

infra.

discussion p. 387 infra.
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remaining period that reflected a net operating loss. It did so by
abandoning the accounting approach to the problem, choosing

instead to direct the paying quantities test toward a more liberal
course. Relying upon two cases" dealing not with the test of pay-

ing quantities but with a temporary cessation of production,
the court proclaims that there are numerous reasons which may

justify a temporary cessation of production. As the problem before
the court was not the temporary cessation of production but the
failure to continue production in paying quantities, the reliance on
these cases indicates the court's willingness to extend their reasoning
to encompass the test of paying quantities. The adoption and favorable application of these temporary cessation of production cases
greatly ameliorates the harshness of the paying quantities require-

ment" and considerably reduces the significance of the problem of
the appropriate period in which to determine paying quantities.
Other Texas cases have not seriously considered the propriety of

the period of time which will properly reflect paying quantities.
For instance, in Garcia v. King ' the lessee on November 15, 1938,
entered into a contract with one Juarez. Juarez was to operate the
lease, which then had six shallow producing wells, and receive as
his compensation the entire production attributable to the seveneighths working interest. This contract continued for eight months,
i.e., until July 15, 1939. However, the primary term had ended Febbruary 6, 1939. The court concluded that the eight-month period was
sufficient to show no production in paying quantities. As production
in 'paying quantities" does not seem to be necessary during the
primary term," except as a condition precedent to extending the
term, it would seem that the proper period for determining paying
quantities should not begin until the last day of the primary term.
It might, therefore, be argued that Garcia v. King2 ' represents approval of a five and one-half month accounting period, i.e., the
period beyond the primary term. Apparently, the period actually
considered by the court was eight months. The case of Sullivan and
Garnett v. James"° concluded without question that "paying quantities" might be determined with propriety over a six-month period.
The question as to the appropriate period in which to determine
25 Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer,
-Tex.-,
323 S.W.2d 944 (1959); Texas Pac.
Coal & Oil Co. v. Bratton, 239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
2 This point is more fully developed pp. 379-80 infra.
27 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
9
" Baker v. Huffman, 176 Kan. 554, 271 P.2d 276 (1954); Long v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245 (1958); Murphy v. Garfield Oil Co., 98 Okla. 273,
225 Pac. 676 (1923).
29 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
30 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
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"paying quantities" according to a mechanical criterion remains unanswered, and rightly so. Because of the multiplicity of factors that

may effect the profitableness of the oil and gas venture, an immutable
period would work many hardships not contemplated by the parties
to the lease. Flexibility, geared to appropriate accounting procedures,
seems to be the correct approach even though some certainty may

be sacrificed. The Clifton decision, if properly construed, will adequately chart future decisions toward an elastic definition of an

appropriate accounting period.
3. Operating Expenses Defined
A proper determination of "operating expenses" depends largely
upon sound accounting methods."1 Paying quantities is a term sufficiently pliable to entertain almost any proper accounting theory.'"
It is submitted that the lessee should be given reasonable latitude in
determining these factors so long as there is no clear abuse. It would
seem that pumpers' salaries, fuel costs, and clearing costs are properly
classified as operating expense items since they relate directly to
"lifting the oil.""3 Difficulty, however, may arise in distinguishing
what may be classed as capital expenditures. It was stated in an early
Texas case that "the expenses necessarily incurred in the equipment

of an oil well should not be taken into account in determining
whether or not production therefrom is in paying quantities."" This

language is consistent with the principle enunciated in Clifton v.
Koontz,"' i.e., the lessee must have a profit over and above "operating expenses." Therefore, expenditures made for acquisition and

retention of the lease (e.g., bonus, delay rentals, and title curative
matters) and the costs of drilling, both tangible and intangible, and
equipping the wells should be treated as capital expenditures and
thus not considered in determining whether there is production in
paying quantities."
"1For a broad discussion of these problems see Smith and Brock, Accounting for Oil
and Gas Producers 268 (1959).
" Although a proper accounting theory would seemingly require the matching of expense with revenue, Herwitz and Trautmann, Materials on Accounting 89 (3d ed. 1959),
it should not be assumed that an immutable accounting theory has been judicially adopted.
The problem will, of course, be largely one of evidence, and as such, the astute leasee
will do well to consider keeping his marginal wells on a cash accounting basis. As the
Clifton decision indicates that a loss for a short period may be immaterial to the continuation of the lease, a cash accounting basis would allow the lessee to place high expenses
into a shorter period of time.
" Noel Estate v. Murray, 223 La. 387, 65 So. 2d 886, 2 0. & G. Rep. 951 (1953);
Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248
Pac. 329 (1926).
4 Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Bruce, 233 S.W. 535, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
-5-Tex-,
325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
'Compare Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 14 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928),
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In Clifton v. Koontz' it was urged that depreciation should be
considered as an expense item. The court correctly concluded that
if the original investment itself was not considered, then depreciation
on this investment should likewise be excluded. However, this rule
must be qualified by the court's language: "We do not have before
us the question of whether or not depreciation on producing equipment should be charged as an operating expense, and therefore, do
not decide the question." (Emphasis added.)"
The question of whether administrative expenses may be classified
as an "operating expense" remains unlitigated." It would appear that
as these items only indirectly affect the lease they should be excluded
in applying the test. By excluding such items altogether, many
problems will be obviated.
The contention was made in the Clifton case that an outstanding
eight per cent overriding royalty should be excluded from the total
income in applying the "paying quantities" criterion. This was repudiated by the court which stated: "The entire income attributable
to the contractual working interest created by the original lease is
to be considered." 4 Therefore, in determining total income, the
lessor must look to the original leasing arrangement. If the lessor
reserved additional royalty or an "overriding royalty" including a
reserved production payment, the "runs" attributable to this interest
would be excluded in computing the lessee's lease income.4
Where more than one lease is being operated by the lessee and one
operating expense is common to all the leases, the problem of allocation arises. In Sullivan and Garnett v. James4' the lessee had allocated
expenses among several properties on a per-well basis. Later, he argued
that these expenses should be allocated to each well according to
the proportion of income produced by each well, thus reducing the
aff'd, 24 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930). But see Archer v. Skelly Oil Co., 314
S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) where the court voluntarily stated that the cost of
pipeline to market gas should be included as an operating expense. The supreme court
sustained the opinion in sending the case back to the trial court but stated in a per curiam
opinion at 317 S.W.2d 47 (1958): "The holding that the cost of construction of a pipeline for marketing the gas should be included in determining whether the well or wells
in question were producing oil in paying quantities is not before us, and we express no
opinion
thereon."
7
a -Tex.325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
as Clifton v. Koontz, supra note 37, at 692.
"9See Cage, supra note 16; Comment, 12 Okla. L. Rev. 179, 182 (1958).

Complete

agreement as to its treatment does not exist even among accountants. See Smith and
Brock, op. cit. supra note 31, at 275.
325 S.W.2d 684, 693 (1959); see Transport Oil Co.
40Clifton v. Koontz, -Tex.-,
v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App. 2d 616, 191 P.2d 129 (1948); Vance v. Hurley, 215
La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949).
"' Compare Vance v. Hurley, supra note 40.
42

308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)

error ref. n.r.e.
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expense of his marginal wells. This tenuous argument was summarily
rejected. It would appear that a sound accounting procedure again
would be the proper course for a lessee; hence, a reasonable allocation
consistent with his accounting procedure would appear acceptable
to the court.

4. Who Determines "Paying Quantities"
The above discussion
term "paying quantities"
could be applied, as the
seems to indicate, in the

was centered on the ramifications of the
as though it were a mechanical test which
court in Sullivan and Garnett v. James4'
following manner:

From these figures, by simply adding up the receipts on the one hand
and the expenditures on the other, the difference would readily determine profit or loss.
However, the application of this criterion may not determine the
question in such an unmitigated fashion. Some courts have held
that the presentation of evidence according to basic accounting
facts would be sufficient." In earlier Texas cases it was established
that the technical aspects of the "paying quantities" test would not
be given exclusive consideration. In Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co.,"
for instance, it was stated that "what amounts to oil and gas in paying quantities is a matter to be determined exclusively by the lessee
acting in good faith."4 Later cases held that the judgment of either
party is not conclusive in determining paying quantities."' It was

stated in Clifton v. Koontz:
In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the standard
by which paying quantities is determined is whether or not under
all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent operator would,
for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for speculation,
continue to operate a well in the manner in which the well in question
was operated.
In determining paying quantities, in accordance with the above stan43Id. at 893.
44McLeon v. Wells, 207 Ark. 303, 180 S.W.2d 325 (1944); Elliott v. Crystal Springs
Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 187 Pac. 692 (1920); Rockcastle Gas Co. v. Horn, 241 Ky. 398,
44 S.W.2d 273 (1931); Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931).
45 253 S.W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error dism.
46 Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., supra note 45, at 915; Nystel v. Thomas, 42 S.W.2d
168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Bouldin v. Gulf Prod. Co., 5 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928) error dism.; Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Bruce, 233 S.W. 535 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921); accord, Denker v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 56 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1932);
Bay State Petroleum Corp. v. Penn Lubricating Co., 121 Ky. 637, 87 S.W. 1102 (1905);
Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 Pac. 329 (1926); Young v. Forest Oil Co.,
194 Pa. 243, 45 Atl. 121 (1899); South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76

S.E. 961 (1912).

4 Stephenson v. Little, 12 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929); Walker, supra note

1, at 514.
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dard, the trial court necessarily must take into consideration all
matters which would influence a reasonable and prudent operator.
Some of the factors are: The depletion of the reservoir and the price
for which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the relative profitableness of other wells in the area, the operating and marketing costs of
the lease, his net profit, the lease provisions, a reasonable period of time
under the circumstances, and whether or not the lessee is holding the
lease merely for speculative purposes."'
This emphatic language clearly shows that an objective accounting
standard will not be conclusive. The court, however, does not discuss
the earlier "good faith" rule, but seems to promulgate a new standard, i.e., the "prudent operator" standard." The two are not necessarily identical. Under the "good faith" rule the test is a subjective one,
i.e., what was this lessee's intent. Under the "prudent operator"
test the particular lessee's intent would be immaterial and the question would be determined by what a mythical third person, the
"prudent operator," would do under identical circumstances. Intent
of the lessee, however, is not completely ignored, for if he seeks
to hold the lease for speculative purposes only, the lease is jeopardized
because such conduct shows no regard for the lessor's rights; thus,
the lessee is not acting as a "prudent operator."
Since the burden of proof is upon the one attacking the lease to
show an absence of production in paying quantities and presumably to
show a failure of the lessee to act as a prudent operator," such person will have a difficult task so long as the lessee acts reasonably.
It seems that the "paying quantities" test is now both objective
and subjective. The objective standard will, of course, be the accounting record and the subjective standard, the "prudent operator"
rule. The liberality granted by the Clifton decision seems more than
justified when it is remembered that the parties to the lease did not
stipulate that production should be in paying quantities. 1
C. Equitable Considerations
Heretofore it has been assumed that the habendum clause required
actual production in some measurable quantity. The question may
4_-Tex.-.,
325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (1959). In addition, the opinion indicates that
Texas Railroad Commission orders are to be considered. But see Haby v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1956). Compare Butler v. Jenkins Oil Corp., 128 Tex.
356, 97 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Comm. App. 1936) dealing with construction of an overriding
royalty.
"' See Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954). Compare the "prudent operator"
test with respect to the covenant to drill offset wells. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker,
117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928).
"Mitchell v. Perkins, 266 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds,
153 Tex. 379, 268 S.W.2d 909 (1954).
" Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
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arise whether this rule would apply should the lessee complete a
gas well capable of producing in paying quantities during the primary term but be unable to find a market for this gas before the
primary term expires. Some jurisdictions have declared that no
termination occurs if the lessee equips the well and markets the gas
within a reasonable time." These decisions are predicated upon
equitable considerations" 3 and upon the concept that "discovery"
alone vests an interest in the lessee."' The proposition that "discovery" within the primary term, followed by diligent operations,
is the equivalent of producing in paying quantities seems to be unequivocally denied in Texas."'
In Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill" a lessee invested approximately $35,000 in completing a gas well during the second year
of a five-year primary term, but a market was not obtained until a
few months after the term expired. It was the lessee's contention
that discovery alone would continue the lease beyond the primary
term. The Texas court held that since the lease was not "producing
in paying quantities" on the day the primary term expired, the
lease had terminated. The court properly justified its conclusion by
reiterating the rule that the lessee holds a determinable fee, which
determines according to the original grant; and, further, that it is
not the duty of the courts to make contracts for the parties."
8 the court under similar
However, in Union Oil Co. v. Ogden"
facts reached the conclusion that the lease had not expired since
the "lessee should have a reasonable time to market the gas." This
was further defined "as the reasonable time it would take appellant
to lay a line from its well to the only available market." It should
be noted, however, that here the market was only one-half mile
away, whereas in other cases considering the point, it appeared that
there was no available market. The Union Oil Co. case seems to
represent a limited exception to the general rule requiring actual
5Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955); Christianson

v. Champlin Ref. Co., 169 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948); Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,
172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952); Pennagrade Oil & Gas Co. v. Martin, 211 Ky. 137,
277 S.W. 302 (1925); Parks v. Sinai Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 295, 201 Pac. 517 (1921);
Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919).
" Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 188 Pac. 347 (1920).
" South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961 (1912); Eastern Oil
Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909).
" Holchak v. Clark, 284 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.
56 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.
"7Other Texas cases have sustained this view. See Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565,
155 S.W.2d 783 (1941); Francis v. Pritchett, 278 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
error ref.; Giles v. McKanna, 200 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.;
Cox v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref.
58278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
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production to continue the lease beyond the primary term, the exception being that sufficient time is allowed the lessee, who has completed a gas well within the primary term, diligently to construct a
line from his well to market, provided there is a reasonably accessible
market."' This problem may, of course, be obviated by a properly
worded shut-in royalty clause."0
II.

THE HABENDUM CLAUSE AS MODIFIED BY THE TYPICAL DRY
HOLE AND SHUT-IN ROYALTY CLAUSES

The habendum clause of the oil and gas lease is significantly

modified by the "dry hole" clause. A typical dry hole clause reads:
If prior to discovery of oil, gas or other mineral on said land or on
acreage pooled therewith lessee should drill a dry hole or holes thereon,
or if after discovery of oil, gas or other mineral, the production
thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate if
lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations within
sixty (60) days thereafter or if it be within the primary term, commences or resumes the payment or tender of rentals or commences
operations for drilling or reworking on or before the rental paying

date next ensuing after the expiration of sixty days from date of
completion of dry hole or cessation of production. If at the expiration
of the primary term, oil, gas or other mineral is not being produced
on said land, or on acreage pooled therewith, but lessee is then engaged
in drilling or reworking operations thereon or shall have completed
a dry hole thereon within sixty (60) days prior to the end of the
primary term, the lease shall remain in force so long as operations are
prosecuted with no cessation of more than sixty (60) consecutive days,
and if they result in the production of oil, gas or other minerals, so
long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced from said
land or acreage pooled therewith."'

Because of the complexity and numerous variations of this clause,
many novel problems have arisen. Although the clause may also affect operations during the primary term, these problems will be
considered only as they relate to continuance of the lease beyond
the primary term." Ignoring the language dealing with delay rentals,
it may be noted that the "dry hole" clause has been divided into

two distinct divisions." The first part of this clause is known as
59

Brown, supra note 12, at 75; Comment, supra note 1, at 345.
" See Masterson, supra note 2.
"For examples of differently worded dry hole clauses see Brown, supra note 12, at 175.
" For a discussion of these problems during the primary term see Berman, Dry Hole,
Drilling Operations, and 30 Day -60 Day Drilling Operation Clauses, 38 Texas L. Rev.
270 (1960); Braly, Problems Presented By Operations During the Primary Term of an
Oil and Gas Lease, Southwestern Legal Foundation 6th Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. &
Tax. 189 (1955).
" Discussion Note, 7 0. & G. Rep. 1511 (1956).
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the continuous drilling clause and was inserted originally to cover
a situation where, after the primary term, production ceased for some
short period. The latter part of the clause is known as the commence
drilling clause. It was created to provide relief from the stringent
application of the habendum clause in the situation where a well
was being drilled at the end of the primary term. The clause originally was designed to keep the lease alive long enough to permit completion of this well beyond the primary term. It would be impossible
to exhaust all the possible fact situations that might arise under
this clause. However, at the present time the fact situations presented

by prior litigation fall into the following groups, and this grouping
will perhaps elucidate some of the nebulous areas which exist in
extending the lease.
A. Cessation Of Production After The Primary Term
The majority view is that complete and permanent cessation of production after the primary term automatically terminates the lease
under the habendum clause." This view is one of literal construction in which equitable rules against forfeiture are inapplicable."
Thus, the fact of cessation caused by unavoidable delay, an act of
God, or financial difficulty of the lessee is immaterial." Temporary
cessation of production, however, for the purpose of improving or
repairing the well does not result in termination. "7 This rule is not
based upon equitable principles," but upon a theory of construction
that the parties to the lease did not intend it to terminate because
of a temporary interruption of production caused by attempts to
improve or repair the well." Whether a particular cessation is considered temporary or permanent must be determined by looking
to the reason for the cessation as well as the time element involved."
In order for the parties to the lease to be assured of the exact
"4Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783 (1941); Waggoner Estate v.
Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929); Francis v. Pritchett, 278 S.W.2d
288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.; Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.; Flato v. Weil, 4 S.W.2d 992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
Stephenson v. Calliham, 289 S.W. 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
65 Flato v. Weil, supra note 64; Stephenson v. Calliham, supra note 64.
66 McLean v. Kishi, 173 S.W. 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Walker, The Nature of the
Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 8 Texas L. Rev. 483, 516
(1930).
07"Francis v. Pritchett, 278 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.; Giles v.
McKanna, 200 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.; Scarborough v. New
Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error dism.
6"Contra, Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1958).
"9See Scarborough v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
error dism. See also Discussion Note, 9 0. & G. Rep. 712 (1958).

323 S.W.2d 944 (1959); Watson v.
-Tex.-.,
70 Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer,
Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783 (1941); Adams v. Bennett, 282 S.W. 909
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error dism.
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period to be allowed for temporary cessation, modern lease forms
now expressly provide that should production cease from any cause,
the lease will not terminate if the lessee commences additional drilling
or reworking operations within sixty days. Two cases arising in
Texas have held that the general rule allowing a temporary cessation
of production is abrogated by the express terms of the lease, and
that a temporary cessation which exceeds the arbitrary sixty-day
period terminates the lease. 1 However, if the production never attained the status of "paying quantities," then there can be no cessation within the meaning of the clause."
Assume that production does not completely cease but does cease
to the extent that the lease is not producing in "paying quantities."
Does the express dry hole clause become applicable and define the
period in which this production may legitimately cease? The petitioner in Clifton v. Koontz' urged that because production had
ceased in paying quantities the sixty-day clause became applicable,
and since there was a lack of paying quantities for more than a
sixty-day period, the lease terminated. The supreme court, however,
pointed out that since it found that production in paying quantities
had not ceased, the sixty-day clause was inapplicable. Although the
reliance upon the temporary cessation of production cases prevented
the application of the sixty-day clause, it was indicated that should
there be a finding 4 of cessation of production in paying quantities
the sixty-day clause would become applicable; and the lessee would
only have a sixty-day period in which to restore production to a
paying quantities status. However, the clause might not benefit the
lessee who is sued for termination of the lease on the basis of failure
to produce in paying quantities when he has done nothing which
would qualify as "reworking or additional drilling operations.""
This portion of the decision, possibly the most untenable portion,
arguably overrules by implication prior Texas authority. The basic
assumption that the cases relating to temporary cessation of production are applicable to cessation in paying quantities appears sound.
71Haby v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Woodson Oil
Co. v. Pruett, 281 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
-Tex.__,
72Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid,
7
3.-Tex.-, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959). The answer to this question depends on whether
the lease extends automatically to the end of this 60 day period and may be continued
only by appropriate operations, or whether the lease terminates at the beginning of this
60 day period only to be revived by conducting the appropriate activity within this period.
See p. 387 infra.
' This decision fails to indicate how such a finding would be possible. The court could
make this finding in a situation where the lessee's activity would come within the conduct
which justifies a temporary cessation of production.
7See discussion p. 387 infra.
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If, however, this body of law is to be considered controlling in
part, then it should, unless a material reason exists to the contrary,
be controlling in toto. The court was apparently oblivious of, or
else failed to understand Woodson Oil Co. v. Pruett" which held
that the sixty-day continuous clause defined the allowable period
of a justifiable cessation of production. The Clifton case concluded
that the sixty-day continuous clause was inapplicable because production in paying quantities never ceased. The reason ascribed by
the court for its finding that paying quantities had not ceased was
that the temporary cessation of production cases justify a cessation
in paying quantities for a short duration, and therefore the sixtyday period was not yet applicable. Under this reasoning it is hard
to see when the sixty-day clause would ever be applicable. Logically,
under this decision, it would not become definitive of the period
allowed for a temporary cessation of paying quantities until the
expiration of the time allowed under the temporary cessation of
production cases, which might be several months. At the expiration
of this period, it would appear, the lessee could then add the sixty-day
clause and urge his justification for a cessation of production in
paying quantities for a substantial period of time.
B. Lessee Engaged At End Of Primary Term
In Drilling Or Reworking Operations
The commence drilling clause allows the lessee to continue the
lease beyond the primary term without production if he has complied with the requirements of "drilling or reworking operations" before the end of the primary term." In the absence of such a clause
the habendum would require the termination of the lease."
The lessee, to be engaged in drilling operations, need not be actually
spudding in the well." If substantial preparations to drill are being
made, e.g., hauling material to the drillsite,s° making and clearing
a location,"1 digging of slush pits and a water supply,82 the lease
7'281 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)

error ref. n.r.e.

7 St. Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 193 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1952); Stano-

lind Oil & Gas Co. v. Newman Bros. Drilling Co., 175 Tex. 489, 305 S.W.2d 169 (1957).
v. Saunders, 109 Kan. 372, 198 Pac. 954 (1921); Fagan v. Burns, 247 Mich.
7"Perkins
674, 226 N.W. 653 (1929). Contra Lester v. Mid-South Oil Co., 296 Fed. 661 (6th Cir.
1924); Simpson v. Buckner, 247 Ky. 564, 57 S.W.2d 464 (1933); McLain v. Harper, 206
Okla. 437, 244 P.2d 301 (1952).
supra note 12, at 127.
7"Brown,

S°Guleke v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Terry
v. Texas Co., 228 S.W. 1019

(Tex. Civ. App.

1921). Compare Forney v. Ward, 62 S.W.

108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
8' Whelan v. R.

Lacy, Inc., 251 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.

1952)

error ref. n.r.e.;

Wheelock v. Batte, 225 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
" McCallister v. Texas Co., 223 S.W. 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error ref.
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continues beyond the primary term. It has recently been held that
re-entering an abandoned hole will satisfy this requirement. The
courts do not always look solely to these objective factors, however,
and the rule has been qualified to require good faith on the part of
the lessee evidenced by diligent prosecution of the drilling operations." Although the issue of what constitutes commencement of
drilling is fairly settled, some question remains as to when drilling
may be said to have ceased which would be material in determining
the time for commencement of a second well should the first be
a failure. s5 The court of civil appeals in Reid v. Gulf Oil Corp.so
stated what may be considersd a proper theory for answering
this question, i.e., "the term 'drilling operations' was intended
to embrace all of the physical and mechanical aspects of bringing about the production of oil or gas in paying quantities." This
same court held that negotations with third persons to install
pipeline facilities for marketing of gas constituted "drilling" operations. The supreme court seemingly approved the theory but disagreed with its application and held as a matter of law that negotiations only could not constitute "drilling" since the term requires
that the lessee be physically or manually conducting activities."
The dry hole clause also allows "reworking operations" to continue
the lease. In Rogers v. Osborns" it was held that the "bleeding" of
a completed well will continue the lease in effect, but the court did
not find it necessary to determine whether it was relying on the
word "drilling" or the word "reworking." In Texas Co. v. Leach8
operations consisting of relegging the derrick, pulling the tubing,
repairing the fuel lines, and repairing roads and bridges so that
equipment could be moved, constituted "reworking operations." As
long as these operations are continued by the lessee in good faith, few
problems will arise."8
Once the required activity is actually begun the clause typically
provides that it shall be continued without cessation of more than
sixty days. One Texas case has held that for this limitation period
to commence to run the cessation of operations must be complete. 1
If the lease fails to provide a definite period allowing cessation of
8 Kothmann v. Boley, 156 Tex.
84Whelan

56, 308 S.W.2d 1 (1957).
v. R. Lacy, Inc., 251 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)

error ref. n.r.e.;

Street v. Masterson, 277 S.W. 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
8
Fields v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 233 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1956).
88323 S.W.2d 107, 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
87 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, -Tex.__,
337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
8 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311 (1953).
so219 La. 613, 53 So. 2d 786 (1951).
90 See Discussion Note, 5 0. & G. Rep. 1370 (1954).
81 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rudd, 226 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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operations, then the common-law standard of "due diligence" will determine the period allowed."'
1. Activity Sufficient to Carry Lease Beyond the Primary Term
Results in Dry Hole
If the activity in which the lessee was engaged at the end of the
primary term results in production in paying quantities, the lease will
endure so long as such production continues."' Should the drilling
result in a dry hole, the question presented is whether or not the
lessee may continue his lease by additional activity.
It has been stated that the dry hole provision is applicable only
to "completed" wells.9" Thus, it becomes essential under many circumstances to define "completed" and "dry hole," as well as determining the time the well was completed as a dry hole. Clearly, some
wells simply cannot be considered as dry holes, e.g., a well producing
oil or gas in less than paying quantities." Nor can a shut-in gas well
with a capacity to produce one million cubic feet of gas per day
be classified as a dry hole." Articulating an exact definition of the
term, however, cannot be done with any accuracy. The term "completed" has been defined as "a well drilled to the extent that either
oil or gas has been found, or is not likely to be found in paying
quantities, by drilling deeper, or drilled to that reasonable depth
at which the product in paying quantity was usually proven or
disproven to exist in that particular locality."9
a. No Discovery During Primary Term
The recent supreme court case of Stanolind Oil &q Gas Co.
v. Newman Bros. Drilling Co." supplies a thorough analysis of the
problems in this area. The action was one to determine the ownership of the leasehold estate covering an undivided one-half interest
in the minerals. Two identical leases were in question. The leases were
kept in force during the primary term by the payment of delay
rentals. A well was commenced on the land prior to the expiration of
the primary terms and was completed as a dry hole after the end
" Reid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 323 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), aff'd, -Tex.__,
337 S.W.2d 267 (1960); Stephenson v. Calliham, 289 S.W. 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
" Clifton v. Koontz, -. Tex.-, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
94 Braly, supra note 62.
95Murphy v. Garfield Oil Co., 98 Okla. 273, 225 Pac. 676 (1923).
O'Cox v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. It was stated: "The
terms 'dry hole' and a well 'producing gas in paying quantities' are not necessarily the converse of each other."
" Braly, supra note 62, at 208. See also Berryman v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 164
F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1947).
"'157 Tex. 489,

305 S.W.2d

169

(1957).
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of those terms. A second well was commenced fifty days after the
completion of the dry hole and was completed as a producer. The
lease contained a dry hole clause similar to that set out above, except that the commence drilling clause contained a thirty-day limitation. By virtue of the commence drilling clause the well being drilled
at the end of the primary term continued the lease until completion
of the well as a dry hole. Since this clause would only allow a cessation of operations for thirty days and as the second well was begun
some fifty days later, it was urged by the lessee that the sixty-day
provision of the continuous drilling clause was applicable, and, therefore, the lease was still in effect. The court concluded that the commence and continuous drilling clauses may be cumulatively employed by the lessee seeking to extend the lease, provided such clauses
are operative.
b. Discovery During Primary Period
Rogers v. Osborn," another supreme court decision, emphasizes the
difficulty created by the dry hole clause. The facts illustrated that before the primary term expired on September 21, 1947, the first well
was commenced on May 15, 1947, and that at the expiration of the
term the lessee was engaged in "reworking" operations on this well.
After the primary term the lessee drilled and completed as a producer a second well, but discontinued activity on the first well.
The trial court found that the first well was not dry. On appeal the
supreme court held the continuous drilling clause inapplicable
because the first well was neither a dry hole nor a producing well
from which it could be said that production had ceased, thus denying
the lessee the cumulative effect of the Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v.
Newman Bros. case. It was held that the commence drilling clause
standing alone required that production result from continuous prosecution of the operations in which the lessee was engaged at the expiration of the primary term and did not include new operations
commenced after the primary term expired.1"

The impact of this case is to require that a lessee must ultimately
obtain production in paying quantities from the very well being
drilled or reworked at the end of the primary term (provided, of
course, the lessee is depending solely on these operations to continue
the lease beyond the primary term) when the lease contains no continuous clause or when the continuous clause is inapplicable.
The continuous drilling clause will be held inapplicable when, as
" 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311

(1953).
1"oAccord Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham, 202 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1953).
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in the Rogers case, there is a finding that the well being drilled is not
a dry hole. Furthermore, the clause will be inapplicable if there is
"discovery" during the primary term.' 1 A definition of discovery has
not been promulgated by the courts, but it would probably include

production in any quantity as well as the discovery of gas in paying
quantities which has not been produced.
The result when the lease does not contain a continuous drilling
clause may be seen in Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham.' There the lessee
relied on the commence drilling clause to carry the lease beyond the
primary term, but as he failed to obtain production from this very
operation, it was held that the lease terminated. The same result
would undoubtedly prevail in Texas.

2. Lessee Completes Gas Well Without Available Market
Most modern leases provide that in the situation where the lessee,
within the primary term, completes a gas well capable of producing
in paying quantities,103 but due to lack of a market or for various
other reasons the well cannot be produced, the lease may be perpetuated for specified periods by the tender of "shut-in" royalty payments.' The "shut-in" clause typically stipulates that production
will be deemed in paying quantities when the appropriate payment
has been made. It is not the purpose of this Comment to examine in

detail the shut-in royalty clause, but merely to discuss the more important decisions as they relate to continuing the lease beyond the
primary term.
The case of Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.' seems to epitomize the treatment this clause will receive from the Texas Supreme
Court. There a gas well was drilled on a lease and completed near
the end but before the expiration of the primary term. The shut-in
royalty payment was not made until shortly after the expiration date
of the primary term. The court concluded that the lease expired at the end of the primary term because there was no production from the leased premises at that time. In other words, the
constructive production allowed by the payment of the shut-in
royalty will not arise until actual payment is tendered. If there is
...Continental Oil Co. v. Boston-Texas Land Trust, 221 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
This result could be altered by a deletion of the first phrase in this clause, i.e., "If prior

to discovery ... "

10202 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1953).
See Vernon v. Union Oil Co., 270 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1959), which construes the

103

word "gas only" that isused in some shut-in clauses.
'4 Masterson, supra note 2; Walker, Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases Providing for the
Payment of an Annual Sum as Royalty on a Nonproducing Gas Well, 24 Texas L. Rev. 478
(1946).
'05 141 Tex. 278, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
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no other lease provision to allow the lessee to continue the lease, the
payment must be made during the primary term as the rule contemplates that the payment must be tendered while the lease is in
effect.
If the gas well is commenced just prior to the end of the primary
term and completed after the primary term with no available market,
to what extent will the dry hole clause determine the time allowed
in which the lessee may tender the shut-in payment? In Shell Oil
Co. v. Goodroe °6 the lessee completed an oil well in 1938, during the
primary term of the lease, which produced oil for a time in paying
quantities. However, because of conservation, it was later shut down
and recompleted as a gas well which produced gas in paying quantities beyond the primary term. On July 25, 1944, the well was shut
in because of a decline in pressure, and on October 16, 1944, some
eighty-two days later, the lessee tendered and the lessor accepted
a shut-in royalty payment which purported to cover the period
from July 25, 1944, to July 25, 1945. The lease contained a continuous drilling clause as discussed above but stated that if "production
shall for any reason cease or terminate, lessee shall have the right at
any time within 90 days from the cessation of such production to
resume drilling or mining operations in an effort to make said leased
premises again produce. . .

."

The lessee did not resume drilling or

mining operations within the prescribed 90 day period. The court
held that as the shut-in payment was made within the 90 day period
allowed by the continuous clause of the lease, the lease was therefore
still in effect. It was also stated that the acceptance of the shut-in
payment by the lessors estopped them from contesting the effectiveness of the payment.
In the very recent case of Reid v. Gulf Oil Corp.,'°" the problem
presented in Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe.°8 was further developed. The
lessee commenced a well on November 29, 1948. The primary term
ended December 9, 1948, and drilling continued until December 23,
1948. By January 15, 1949, testing was completed and the well was
shut in as one capable of producing gas in paying quantities. On
January 18, 1949, the well's bottom hole pressure was tested. On
February 15, 1949, the lessee tendered a shut-in royalty payment
covering one year from January 15, 1949, but the lessor refused to
accept it and asserted that the lease terminated on the date the well
was shut in. The lease contained a continuous clause similar to those
106 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.
107

323 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), aff'd, -Tex.-.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.

'0' 197 S.W.2d 395

337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
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discussed above but the commence clause was worded somewhat
differently. It stated:
If at the expiration of the primary term . . . Lessee is then engaged
in operations for drilling or reworking operations . . . this lease shall
not terminate if Lessee does not allow more than sixty (60) days to
elapse between the abandonment of one well and the commencement
of drilling or reworking operations on another until production is
obtained. (Emphasis added.)
Since there was no production from the leased premises at the expiration of the primary term, the lease would automatically terminate according to the habendum clause."' In order to extend the
lease the lessee necessarily had to assert the effectiveness of some savings clause of the lease, in this instance the payment of shut-in royalty. No dispute existed, however, as to the actual payment of the
shut-in royalty. Thus, the basic issue was whether the shut-in payment was timely.
The fundamental premise of the decision is that the shut-in payment must be made at a time when the lease is in effect. This premise
emanates from Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,110 the rationale
being that the constructive production created by the clause begins
only from the time the payment is actually tendered.
Relying on this concept, the court of civil appeals repudiated the
lessee's contention that he should be allowed a reasonable time in
which to make the shut-in payment.'
The court then scrutinized
the dry hole clause of the lease for some basis on which to extend
the lease to the time of the shut-in payment. It was concluded that
the continuous clause was inapplicable since production did not cease
if production never began in paying quantities. The only other alternative was the commence clause. Although this clause would extend the lease beyond the primary term by the continuance of drilling operations commenced during the primary term, because of its
particular wording, i.e., abandonment, it was not definitive of the
period allowed for cessation of operations. As the clause clearly did
not define the period for prosecution of these drilling operations, the
court said that the period would be determined by common-law
standards of due diligence. It was stated that the installation of marketing facilities, which remained to be done at the time the well was
shut in, was classifiable as a "drilling" operation."' Concluding that
1°9Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
ref.

110141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339

(1943).

'Reid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 323 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
"'See discussion pp. 380-81 supra.
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the lessee still had some "drilling" remaining to be done when the
well was shut in, the court remanded to determine what period
should be allowed the lessee to conduct this further activity. If the
trial court should conclude that the proper period was at least thirtydays, then the shut-in royalty payment would have been tendered
while the lease was in effect and the lease would have been continued.
It should be noted that the case was remanded to determine a period
of time, not whether further activities were in fact conducted.
The Supreme Court of Texas agreed with the court of civil appeals
that the lessee does not have a reasonable time for making a shut-in
royalty payment when a gas well is completed and shut in beyond
the primary term.113 The court also affirmed the lower court's holding
that there could be no cessation of production if production never
began in paying quantities. The court did disagree, however, as to
the definition of "drilling operations." It stated that as a matter of
law negotiations with third parties to lay and install a pipeline did
not constitute "drilling operations," since the term "operations" contemplates physical or manual activity by the lessee. Since nothing
remained for the lessee to do in the way of drilling operations, the
shut-in payment was not tendered at a time while the lease was in
effect and therefore the lease had terminated.
These cases evolve the interesting question of whether the usual
sixty-day period of the continuous1 . and commence clauses operate
to extend the lease automatically for this limited period of time regardless of whether there is a resumption of the required activity
before the end of this period, or whether the lease terminates upon
the cessation of production or drilling activity only to be revived by
later conduct required by the lease within this period. The answer
to this question remains speculative.
Both cases assume that the lease continues to the end of the stated
sixty-day period and, therefore, any activity which would extend
the lease, e.g., payment of shut-in royalty, may be made during this
period and the lease will be continued regardless of the resumption
of the required activity. In both cases emphasis was placed on whether the shut-in royalty was tendered during the proper time period
and not upon the future resumption of drilling or reworking activity. Because of the element of estoppel, the strength of Shell
Oil Co. v. Goodroe1' on this point is abated. Gulf Oil Corp. v.
1 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, -Tex.-.,
337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
114 Normally, the continuous clause will have no application as it usually refers to
"dry holes" or "cessation" of production.
'" 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.
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Reid... cannot be considered as authority for the proposition that
the lease extends automatically for the usual sixty-day period. It is
significant, however, that the court does not repudiate this theory
but merely finds it inapplicable under the special terms of this particular lease. It is believed the holding is of limited application, i.e.,
its result may be circumvented by (1) using a lease form which
does not limit the period allowed for cessation of operations to situations where the first well must be abandoned, (2) if the lease form
does use the language of abandonment then the lessee should tender
his shut-in payment while he is still conducting physical activity
which might be classifiable as drilling operations, and (3) redrafting
the shut-in clause using express language that payment may be made
within a definite period after the well is shut in.
The holding that there is no reasonable time in which to make a
shut-in payment once the lease has expired is justified on the basis of
Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.' Nevertheless, this result could
lead to very technical and inequitable results. Should the lease be of
the form used in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid'1 and should it later be
ruled by the supreme court that the lessee has no right or privilege
to make a shut-in payment until the well is in fact shut in, then a
logical conclusion would require that the lease could not be continued by a shut-in payment since the right to pay the shut-in payment did not arise until the well was shut in and once the well was
shut in the lease expired. Since the payment could not theoretically
be made at the precise moment of shutting in the well, the payment
would be too late.
This issue of these cases, i.e., may shut-in royalty payments be
made during the extended sixty-day period of the commence-continuous clauses and the lease be continued without further drilling
or reworking activity, and the larger problem of whether the lease
extends automatically for this sixty-day period in all situations, has
not been unequivocally settled. The cases do indicate that the lease
is continued in effect for the full length of the period (usually sixty
days) allowed for cessation of activities. It has been assumed in some
cases that the extension of the lease for this stated period was automatic"' and it is believed this theory will prevail. The liberal interpretation approach of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Newman Bros.
a-Tex..,

337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).

117 141 Tex. 274,

".-Tex.-,

"a McQueen v. Sun Oil Co., 213 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1954); Woodson Oil Co. v. Pruett,
281 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
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Drilling Co."' may be applied to buttress this position. There the
court, when faced with a situation demanding termination of the
lease under the commence clause, found that the continuous clause
could be read into the commence clause. Thus, a court may also be
able to go outside the shut-in clause and interpret some other clause
as an aid to extending the lease, e.g., the dry hole clause.
By a complete adoption of this theory a lessee would be enabled
during this extended period to conduct such activity, other than additional drilling or reworking, as would continue the lease, e.g., payment of shut-in royalty or perhaps pooling or unitization. Commitment to this theory would also mean that the lessee would have
the benefit of this sixty-day period in applying the paying quantities
test, i.e., if a lessor should assert that over a period chosen by him
the accounting record revealed a net loss to the lessee, as in Clifton v.
Koontz,' 1 then the period would automatically be shortened by this
sixty-day period without additional activity.
III. CONCLUSION
The ultimate standard for determining the rights and obligations
flowing from the oil and gas lease transaction obviously is the oil and
gas lease instrument. Since each clause of the lease is dependent upon
and often substantially modified by the other clauses of the lease, an
accurate interpretation of the lease relationship demands that each
clause be considered in context and that the interrelationship of the
clauses be carefully considered. Regrettably, one must recognize that
many people who enter into oil and gas leases fail to appreciate the
single significance of this basic instrument, choosing rather to submit abjectly to the use of standard forms which often fall short of
the actual expectations and intentions of the parties. When one recognizes the many contingencies which may arise and drafts the
lease instrument accordingly, then the unnecessary problems and expensive litigation exemplified in this Comment will be avoided.

Gene L. McCoy

Tex. 489, 305 S.W.2d 169 (1957).
--- Tex.-.
325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
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